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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
evidence has been introduced." The court further states "A person's men-
tal condition may not be such as to make him irresponsible for his acts and
yet it may be such as to relieve him from the extreme penalty imposed by
the law for the committed act." In a more recent case of State v. Schilling
(N. J., 1920), 112 A. 400, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved the
following charge to the jury: "[If] at the time of doing the act, the evi-
dence shows you that the defendant was so feeble-minded that his faculties
were prostrated and rendered him incapable of forming the specific intent
to kill with its wilful, deliberate and premeditated character, then although
it is no defense or justification, his offense would be murder in the second
degree." While these decisions are not in accord with the majority view,
they are indicative of a progressive spirit, and have at least refused to
shackle a particular case with inflexible tests which can not possibly be ap-
propriate generally. F. E. M., '30.
JuDiciAL NOTICE-LAws OF ANOTHER STATE.-In a suit in a Missouri
Court to have a decree of divorce granted in Illinois declared invalid and to
secure separate maintenance, the plaintiff offered evidence of statutes of
Illinois to show that the divorce judgment obtained there by publication was
void. Held, this evidence was inadmissible. "Where the cause of action
rests upon the laws of another state, and the same are not merely an evi-
dential part of the cause of action, they must be both pleaded and proved."
Keena v. Keena (Mo. 1928), 10 S. W. (2d) 344.
At common law, courts of the several states being considered as foreign
to one another, are not bound to take judicial notice of the laws of any
other state. Statutes of other states are regarded as matters of fact, and
when relied on to support a cause of action or defense must be pleaded and
proved as other facts. Fidelity Loan Securities Co. v. Moore (1919), 280
Mo. 315, 217 S. W. 286. This common doctrine prevailed in Missouri until
an act was passed in 1927 providing: "In every action or proceeding where-
in the law of another state of the United States of America is pleaded, the
courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the public statutes and
judicial decisions." In deciding the principal case, the Missouri Court of
Appeals apparently disregarded this piece of constructive legislation, for
all of the cases cited and relied on by the court were decided prior to the
enactment of this statute. It is an unquestioned rule that a court will take
judicial notice of the statutes of its own state. Lyons v. Reinecke (1926),
10 F. (2d) 3; Dortch v. Reichel Motor Co. (Mo. A. 1920), 223 S. W. 675;
Moore v. Clem (Tex. A. 1927), 295 S. W. 941. Apparently the only ex-
cuse the Missouri court can offer for failing to employ the statute in ques-
tion is the fact that it overlooked it entirely. Had the court heeded this
statute, proof would have been unnecessary, for judicial notice is the cog-
nizance of certain facts which judges and jurors already know. United
States v. Hammers (1917), 241 F. 542. In deciding the principal case
without regard to the statute the Missouri court ignored the modern ten-
dency to abandon the cumbersome machinery used in most of the states.
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The courts of Massachusetts and Wisconsin are required by statute to take
judicial notice of the laws of other states and have applied the statute
beneficially. Holmes v. Dunning (1927), 260 Mass. 250, 157 N. E. 358;
Owen v. Owen (1922) 178 Wisc. 609, 190 N. W. 353. In J. R. Watkins
Medical Co. v. Johnson (1917), 129 Ark. 384, 196 S. W. 465, the court
recognized that it was required by statute to take judicial knowledge of the
laws of other states and added, "It is our duty to pursue inquiries suffi-
cient to make that knowledge real as far as possible." Possibly the Mis-
souri statute would be more effective minus the requirement that the foreign
law must be "pleaded." To avail himself of the public laws of Missouri, a
plaintiff only need state the facts which bring his case within the statutory
provisions. Bowen v. The Missouri Pacific Railway Co. (1893), 118 Mo.
541, 24 S. W. 436. Perhaps this is the apex toward which state legislatures
are gradually tending. Since utter disregard for a state statute is hardly
excusable, the decision in the principal case seems clearly to be erroneous,
for it can be justified only according to the common law rule which the
1927 act certainly changed in part. J. J. C., '30.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -ESTABLISHING AIRPORT AS PUBLIC AND
MUNICIPAL PURPOSE.-Plaintiff brought suit to restrain the City of St.
Louis and its officials from issuing and delivering bonds for the purpose
of utilizing proceeds in the acquisition and development of land for an air-
port. Held, that establishment of an airport was a public and municipal
purpose and within the power of the city. Dysart v. City of St. Louis (Mo.,
1928), 11 S. W. (2d) 1045.
It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that an attempt
to raise money for private purposes is unconstitutional. Various tests for
ascertainment of a public purpose have been advanced, but that generally
used is: "The proceeds of the tax must be used for the support of the
government or for some of the recognized objects of government or di-
rectly to promote the welfare of the community." State v. Orear (1919),
277 Mo. 303, 210 S. W. 392; Halbruegger v. St. Louis (1924), 302 Mo.
573, 262 S. W. 379. The application of this test or any appropriate
test to the establishment of an airport is limited to a very few cases by
the novelty of such action by cities. The decisions in these cases have
consistently been to decide such action to be within the power of the
municipality. City of Wichita v. Clapp (1928), 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12;
State ex rel City of Lincoln v. Johnson (Neb., 1928), 220 N. W. 273; State
ex rel Hill v. City of Cleveland (Ohio, 1927), 160 N. E. 241. These opin-
ions have cited two principal reasons for their holdings: that they bene-
fit the particular community through facilitating air commerce, and
that they afford to every citizen an opportunity of direct utilization.
There can be little doubt that the acquisition of land for a public park
is a public purpose, but the question of a proper park use has required a
number of adjudications by the courts. A tourist camp has been held a
proper park use. State ex rel. Dodge City (1927), 123 Kan. 316, 255 P.
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